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Studying the Developmental State: Theoretical and 
Methodological Issues in Research on Industrial Policy 
and State-Led Development in Africa 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines theoretical and methodological issues in the study of African 
developmental states. We argue that applying this concept beyond East Asia, must take into 
account changes in the global economic context–in particular systemic tendencies towards 
deficient consumer demand – to uncover the conditions under which demand for commodity 
production remains or becomes expansionary. We further argue for a mixed methods case study 
approach to structural transformation, blending quantitative and qualitative evidence at 
multiple levels of analysis. The examples of concrete manufacturing and oil and gas in Nigeria 
and Tanzania illustrate our approach to researching state-led development in Africa. 
INTRODUCTION 
East Asia’s developmental states structurally transformed their economies from largely 
agrarian subsistence to achieve high levels of industrial development, high income status and 
technological market leadership. While there was no one strategy followed by Japan, South 
Korea, and other East Asian developmental states, many have argued the core tenets of their 
approach represent an ‘East Asian model’. 1  More recently, several African states are 
attempting to emulate this approach to industrialization and structural transformation, albeit 
under very different political and economic circumstances.  
Yet, the new era of ‘Africa rising’ has so far failed to deliver significant developmental benefit 
to the continent. Economic growth has not raised standards of living or reduced poverty.2 
Despite the new interest in African developmental states, no African state meets the supposed 
criteria of the East Asian model, which is not surprising given ongoing debates about whether 
any East Asian states ever had the ideal type Weberian bureaucracies suggested in the literature 
on developmental states.3 For Whitfield et al,4 the insight that East Asian developmental states 
had varied experiences, made numerous improvised decisions and ad hoc policy changes, and 
never followed a grand strategy, suggests that the entire developmental state concept must be 
abandoned in the search for a general theory on what makes successful industrial policy. This 
debate involves two separate but interlinked issues: which economic policies ought to be 
implemented to achieve high rates of growth in the productive sectors of the economy, and 
under which political conditions they are adopted.  
With the other papers in this special issue, we continue to hold that the language of 
developmental states is useful in describing what is being attempted by and what are the 
developmental outcomes of state-intervention. Rather than seek general 
conditions/preconditions for structural transformation, we raise some important theoretical and 
methodological issues about how to advance the understanding of state-led structural 
transformation in Africa. At the theoretical level, we stress the necessity to broaden 
conceptually the dimensions of economic policy and agency relations that research on state-
led development ought to dissect in order to understand patterns of success and failure.  
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In particular, we argue that recent research on industrial development neglects demand for 
profitable production as one among other determinants of investment under the assumption of 
a potentially unlimited export-market. Rethinking economic policies in support of demand is 
all the more relevant for SSA economies today when considering the shrinking space for 
export-led industrialisation exposed by Asian drivers and systemic global demand deficiencies 
stemming from the financialisation of developed and developing economies. By extension, we 
argue that, when trying to understand the extent to which and the reasons why the growth of 
demand is supported or not by domestic policy, greater weight must be given to the study of 
agency relations beyond state-business relations. In terms of methodology, we show that 
descriptive quantitative analysis can help in the contextualisation and therefore generalisation 
of focused firm-level qualitative research, which in many cases is the only way to understand 
the dynamics of particular sectors and clusters of firms. 
In Part 1, we discuss in greater depth the above-mentioned theoretical issues. In Part 2, we 
explore selective examples of Tanzania and Nigeria, looking at the national economy, chosen 
sectors and key firms to explore the scope for and limitations to domestic sources of demand 
and show how qualitative and descriptive quantitative analysis can be blended at the level of 
the macro-economy, specific sectors and (clusters of) firms to gain new insight into African 
developmental states. While neither Tanzania nor Nigeria would fit any definition of a classical 
developmental state, the theoretical extensions and empirical approach proposed can contribute 
to gain further insights into the reasons for (partial) success and failure of structural 
transformation.    
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Case-study method and theoretical inference 
For research on state-led development, the case study method5 has the advantage of producing 
the context and time dependent knowledge needed to trace complex multi-dimensional, path-
dependent and path-shaping processes such as structural change. Yet, case studies have been 
criticised for their inability to produce generalizable conclusions. Some case-study researchers 
maintain that this should not be our aim in the first place;6 instead case studies are to build 
‘naturalistic generalisations’ through a wealth of detail derived from a multitude of concrete 
cases that build a tacit understanding of causal processes which can be subjectively and 
intuitively applied. 7  Alternatively, case studies are said to help formulating transferable 
working hypotheses if there are sufficient similarities between source and target cases.8  
Yet, even the concepts of ‘transferability’ and ‘naturalistic generalisation’ imply that the 
findings of one case can be extrapolated to a wider, however defined, set of cases. Gomm and 
Hammersley9 point out that sound induction needs to be both theoretically informed and 
systematically tested across large numbers of cases. That is, theoretical induction firstly relies 
on a process of conceptual thinking in formulating what is to be explained and the factors 
explaining it. Secondly, researchers have to seek a large number of cases where the explanatory 
factor is present so as to check whether and under which conditions it has the effect predicted. 
10 While this paper cannot offer systematic testing across a large number of cases, we seek to 
broaden conceptually the dimensions of economic policy and agency relations that research on 
state-led development ought to dissect to add to our understanding of patterns of success and 
failure arguing in particular that research on developmental states needs to uncover the reasons 
why demand for manufacturing output becomes expansionary or fails to do so.  
The extent to which the specific case is symptomatic for a wider phenomenon needs to be 
established empirically. Gomm et al advocate collecting and presenting information about the 
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case and the population by way of extensive analysis of secondary data.11 For research on 
structural change, the characterisation of a case with respect to a broader population of cases 
can be done at the economy level, sector level or firm level depending on the focus and scope 
of the study but faces problems of availability and quality of data in the SSA context, where 
even basic indicators of economic activity like National Accounts data are subject to 
considerable margin of error and reliable sector or firm-level data are even more difficult to 
obtain.12 Jerven argues, however, that even imperfect data can produce useful analysis to the 
extent that their limitations are clearly documented and descriptive quantitative analysis is 
complemented with qualitative analysis. 
For our purposes, the cases of concrete manufacturing and oil and gas are useful for studying 
state-led development because they are not normally emphasized as sectors that can drive 
structural transformation. The oil and gas industry is more associated with capital intensive 
enclave development while construction is generally not though to lead to increased 
productivity. However, by studying these sectors in two prominent cases at the level of the 
national economy, strategic sectors, and clusters of firms, we are able to suggest possible 
approaches for African developmental states. 
 
African Manufacturing Activities and Systematic Global Demand Deficiencies 
Hirschman13 starts from the observation of “frustrated savings”, i.e. mobilisable savings not 
invested in productive activities but, instead, showing up in luxury consumption, capital flight 
etc. To find an answer to the question what constrains investment demand, Hirschman 
distinguishes between autonomous and induced demand. Correspondingly, we can distinguish 
between two types of demand constraints on industrial output growth: a Keynesian-type and 
Kaldorian-type demand constraint. The former concerns entrepreneurial expectations about the 
level of aggregate demand. Rosenstein-Rodan’s14 shoe factory argument, for instance, relies 
on the observation that mass-production requires mass-consumption. An important constraint 
thereto is income distribution: if income distribution is very narrow then manufactured goods 
can only be sold to the relatively few rich, who given their small numbers cannot sustain 
demand for mass-production.15 
Regarding induced demand, mass-production of good A induces demand for inputs to the 
production of Good A (technical complementarity) or consumed with A (consumption 
complementarities).16 These ‘linkages’ constitute an in built investment multiplier process that 
does not require an anticipation of demand in the Keynesian sense.17 However, backwardly-
linked industries can still face demand constraints to the extent that there are differences in the 
rates of growth of the value of output and therefore purchasing power along the demand chain. 
In the Kaldorian growth literature it is the growth of agricultural purchasing power which limits 
the growth of manufacturing output growth and later the growth of export demand.18 
Studying the causes of the demise of African manufacturing industries starting in the mid-
1970s, research produced by the Washington institutions at the height of the neoliberal policy 
reversal, surprisingly, points to stagnating domestic and global demand.19 Yet these issues are 
interpreted as problems of overproduction caused by distorted market signals,20 which are best 
corrected through free-market supply-side reforms and trade liberalisation.  
To reassert the legitimacy of state-intervention against the free-market paradigm, the critical 
scholarship on the East Asian Developmental States (DS) emphasised market failures in 
technology acquisition.21 To debunk the free-trade paradigm, critical scholarship on the East 
Asian DS stressed that export-led industrialisation does not result from “neutral trade regimes” 
as purported by the Washington Consensus.22 Instead, ISI and EOI are dependent on each other 
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and rely both on market distorting state-intervention, 23  though a key factor explaining 
successful industrial policy in East Asia was “how vigorously and rapidly exportables were 
extracted from a sequentially rising number of import substitution sectors”.24 
Taken together, the critical scholarship on the East Asian DS challenges the type of supply-
side policies necessary to achieve (industrial) output growth but largely side-lines the demand-
side conditions necessary to sustain manufacturing production under the assumption of a 
potentially unlimited export market. 25  Even in models of structural change incorporating 
demand, 26  the only (relevant?) component of aggregate demand is export demand. This 
conceptually circumscribes the scope and nature of macroeconomic policies in support of 
industrial development, by and large to incentivising exporters through a depreciated exchange 
rate.27  
Export demand is specific in that it links the Keynesian and Kaldorian type of demand problems. 
Export demand is a component of aggregate demand and as such affects entrepreneurial 
expectations in the Keynesian sense. Beyond providing market outlets, export demand 
constrains imports necessary for (ongoing) production processes.28 The expansion and gradual 
upgrading of manufacturing exports has therefore unsurprisingly and rightly been singled out 
as a key to successful industrialisation but the assumption of unlimited export markets is 
untenable. At least for certain manufacturing sectors there is excess capacity relative to world 
demand leading to intense price and wage competition between developing countries and 
ultimately to race to the bottom (‘fallacy of composition’).29 The terms of trade for low value-
added manufacturing products are declining and the concurrent attempt of each country to 
boost its competitiveness through wage depression further undercuts a vital source of domestic 
purchasing power and further contributes to the deflation in world demand.30 In fact, sub-
Saharan African economies today face a global economic context marked by systematic 
demand deficiency. While aggregate export earnings of many SSA economies increased since 
the turn of the century,31 manufacturing exports face displacement by Chinese products. 32 In 
addition, the financialisation of developed and developing economies crowds out production 
in the real economy and tends to worsen income distribution thereby depressing consumer 
demand.33 
Against this context, one key challenge of developmental policy will be to mobilise domestic 
consumer and inter-sectoral demand. This has a number of implications for policy making 
located at the macro- and inter-sectoral level. If demand growth is among other a function of 
income distribution, then supporting manufacturing sector development will involve policy 
choices on the distribution side, notably with respect to the regulation of labour compensation 
and wage-bargaining institutions, income redistribution through taxation or measures 
increasing the disposable income of households like the provision of affordable housing. 
Government expenditure being a component of aggregate demand also implies a central role 
for fiscal policy in sectors with a strong potential for linkages and government procurement of 
manufacturing output.  
On the intersectoral level, agricultural productivity acts as a pace-setting factor for backwardly 
linked manufacturing industries like fertilisers and machinery, which finds ample empirical 
support in the development experiences of newly industrialised countries. 34  Yet, the 
intersectoral dimension of policy making in support of industrial development is not limited to 
agriculture. Construction activities are considered by Hirschman as an important source of 
linkages (induced investment demand):  
 “An example (…) is cement and reinforcing steel rods in the construction, say, of downtown 
office buildings. (…) the existence of new office buildings strengthens demand for a great 
variety of goods and services: from modern office furniture and equipment (…), to parking and 
restaurant facilities, stylish secretaries and eventually perhaps to more office buildings (…).”35 
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The examples of the concurrent growth of the construction, mining and manufacturing sectors 
in Tanzania and Nigeria show that government fostered linkages between those sectors can 
spur inter-sectoral demand driven growth and even contribute to the formation of a final 
consumer demand base via employment generation. 
 
State-business relations and beyond 
Political science research on developmental states emphasises that the state has to stand apart 
from the market and vested interests found within it. Evans36 coined the term ‘embedded 
autonomy’, or a state autonomous from yet constrained by the society it represents, to exclude 
self-serving bureaucratic elites that appropriate surplus from the ideal type developmental state. 
However, conceiving vested interests as a deviation from the ideal-type norm conceals how 
specific economic, political and ideological interests come about, what sustains them 
(materially and ideologically) and how they change over time.37  
The embedded autonomy framework therefore remains too general. For subsidy schemes to 
work, the threat of removing the subsidy has to be credible as otherwise firms do not have the 
necessary incentives to achieve learning by doing. 38  The feasibility of eliminating losers 
depends on the nature of patron-client networks not their absence. Hence, industrial strategies 
have to be adapted to the organisational and structural distribution of economic and political 
power within specific countries.39 Whitfield et al.40 is helpful in showing that ‘pockets of 
efficiency’ in productive sectors can emerge in different ‘political settlements’ whether marked 
by vulnerable authoritarian, weak dominant party, strong dominant party or competitive 
clientelist coalitions. Yet, a key political challenge lies in the mediation of interests in 
competition with one another, for instance along a supply/ demand chain where processors 
interest to pay the lowest price on inputs collides with producers’ objective to obtain the highest 
price for their output. 
The embedded autonomy framework remains too narrow in the sense that it assesses the DS 
through state-business relations alone. Amsden maintains: “Labour repression is the basis of 
late industrialization everywhere (…). Developmental differences among late industrializers 
are best explained in terms of the discipline imposed on big business, not labour (…).”41 
However, structural transformation is also process of social transformation and invariably 
associated to distributional conflicts over a growing pie. Disentangling those is important not 
least because they shed light on the spending behaviour of different social strata and the state.  
Taken together, understanding the nature of the accumulation process requires an 
understanding of what motivates investment (for domestic and export markets), what 
constrains the growth of demand and supply and to what extent savings are mediated into 
productive investment. The following agency relations therefore must be dissected by research 
on developmental states: Firstly, state-business relations to understand how a state can 
discipline businesses within a particular political settlement. Secondly, capital-labour relations 
to shed light on distributional conflicts occurring in the growth process and how these affect 
the spending behaviour of different social strata. Thirdly, industry-finance relations to 
understand under which conditions savings are channelled into productive sector investment. 
LESSONS FROM TANZANIA AND NIGERIA 
The previous section aimed at broadening conceptually the dimensions of economic policy and 
agency relations that research on state-led development ought to dissect, while arguing that, at 
the empirical level, case study research should rely on a mix of qualitative and extensive 
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descriptive quantitative analysis. While the scope of this paper does not allow for all of these 
issues to be discussed at sufficient depth empirically we consider them important foundations 
on which future case study work can build. In what follows, we discuss selective examples 
from Tanzania and Nigeria to illustrate the possibilities for and limitations of demand-driven 
linkage formation across sectors, the formation of a consumer demand base and distributional 
conflict in the process of structural change. 
 
The African construction boom and cement production in Tanzania and Nigeria 
Average real annual GDP growth rates in SSA (excl. South Africa) had been picking up since 
the turn of the century, averaging 6.5% in the period 2001-2013 against 2.5% over the 1990s. 
The agricultural and manufacturing sectors realised higher growth rates than over the 1990s 
but fell slightly short of overall GDP growth rates. The construction sector is the only sector of 
the real economy, which realized higher growth rates than total GDP in all developing regions. 
Yet, growth rates of the construction sector in SSA are highest across developing regions with 
9.6% over the period 2000-13, even ahead of the BRICS (9%) (Table 1). 
The slower than average increase in output of manufacturing goes together with slow increases 
or even decreases in indicators of structural change, real manufacturing value added (MVA) 
per capita increasing only from $68.4 in 1990 to $78.1 in 2013. By comparison, in 2013 MVA 
per capita in China amounts to $1,267 and as much as $8,013 in high income countries like 
Germany. Relative to GDP, manufacturing value added even decreased in SSA from 11.8% in 
1990 to 8.7% in 2013 (Table 1).  
Tanzania and Nigeria are two SSA economies that show more dynamic manufacturing sectors 
than the SSA average, with MVA per capita more or less doubling in both countries relative to 
1990 and growth rates of manufacturing exceeding average aggregate output growth. The data 
on sectoral growth, analysed alongside state intervention in those sectors, can deepen our 
understanding of developmental activities of the state and their relative success. In Tanzania, 
sectors leading output growth are manufacturing, construction and mining. In Nigeria, these 
are agriculture, manufacturing and construction (Table 1), raising the question about the link 
and policy mediation between these sectors. 
 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
One of the most noteworthy linkages forming between the construction and manufacturing 
sectors in Nigeria and Tanzania is cement production. Increased cement production is an 
Africa-wide trend, cement production per capita in SSA increasing by a factor of more than 
five since 1990. Tanzania’s small but above SSA average production base in 1990, doubled by 
2014 but increased slower than the SSA average. By contrast, Nigeria’s production base 
emerged from zero in 1990 to becoming SSA’s biggest cement producer (excluding South 
Africa) with a production base substantially above SSA average in 2014 (Table 2).  
 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
Comparing cement production in both countries, we find in both countries efforts to support 
domestic cement production through industrial policy but it is government spending on 
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infrastructure, which makes the production of building materials profitable in the first place. In 
Nigeria we observe a particular conjunction of forces, in which the anticipated growth of the 
final consumer demand base supports the reinvestment of cement profits domestically. The 
Tanzanian case illustrates how a comprehensive development strategy, aiming at building 
backwardly linked supply chains and supporting the growth of a domestic consumer demand 
base, can face obstacles at various levels. In the cement industry, competing interests of 
producers of energy inputs and the cement producers make the use of domestically produced 
energy inputs difficult, despite comprehensive government plans. The domestic consumer 
demand base, while growing, faces the dominance of low income generating activities and 
illustrates the need to study distributional conflict beyond state-business relations. 
 
Cement manufacturing – the case of Nigeria  
Still a major importer of cement in 2007, the build-up of the Nigerian production base started 
following successful lobbying of local cement importers (mainly the Dangote Group) and 
subsequent government protection in the form of licences, tax breaks and import duties 
imposed by the Obasanjo Government. Phasing out import licences since 2012, those with 
existing licences could only import under the condition of developing further domestic 
production. Over the course of just few years Nigeria has become the largest cement producer 
in SSA, second only to South Africa. What is more, Nigeria’s Dangote becomes a major 
investor in other African countries – successfully competing with the South African Pretoria 
Cement Corporation (PCC) and the major European multinationals over the rapidly expanding 
African cement market.42  
Two major producers control the huge Nigerian production base of 39Mta installed capacity in 
2014 (Table 3). Starting out as a cement import business in 1981, Dangote Cement, as of 2014, 
has a market share of about 60% spread over five plants. Lafarge, controlling about 32% of the 
Nigerian market, has undertaken efforts to consolidate its position against Dangote by way of 
progressing its ownership in the Ashaka and Unicem cement plants to 100% and consolidating 
Lafarge Nigeria and Lafarge South Africa into a joint stock exchange listing.43 
 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 
As of 2015, Dangote operates cement plants in eight SSA countries and has reported a 25.6% 
rise in revenues in 2015 ($2.47bn).44 Apart from further planned expansions of its African 
cement operations, the company has reported plans to expand beyond Africa into Asia and 
Latin America.45 
Pushed by the Obasanjo government to move from cement import into cement production, 
Dangote can be considered an important catalyst for manufacturing in Nigeria not only because 
the group has successfully accumulated capital in the lucrative cement business and even 
expanded abroad but more importantly, because this capital has been reinvested domestically 
in labour intensive agro-alimentary (including fruit juice, dairy, bottled water and pasta 
production) as well as petro-chemical activities (oil refinery and a fertiliser project). Quoted in 
the Financial Times, Dangote maintains that Nigeria’s growing population and, by extension, 
“demand for basic supplies” was a driving force behind his decision to reinvest in Nigeria.46 
Other African owned companies and Western multinationals without links to cement 
production tap into this emerging market for fast-growing consumer goods as well. Beloxxi 
Biscuits and Leventi Foods are among the largest bakery and snack producers in Nigeria. The 
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food processing company Zambeef is market leader in Zambia, now expanding into Nigeria. 
Expecting to triple sales to $2.2 billion by 2023, Nestlé Nigeria invested $446 million between 
2003 and 2014 and plans another $635 million before 2023. Diageo and Heineken also increase 
their footprint, the former selling by now more Guinness in Nigeria than in Ireland.47  
 
Construction and building materials manufacturing in Tanzania 
There are two key aspects of recent industrial policy making in Tanzania. Firstly, there is a 
clear recognition of the importance of the domestic market in supporting manufacturing growth. 
Government strategy documents published following the Tanzanian Development Vision 2025 
(TDV) emphasise that a viable export sector forms on the basis of growth in domestic demand 
in critical mass to allow for economies of scale:  
“(…) the best scenario would be that of having domestic demand in critical mass that will 
amortize and absorb all the investment costs with an acceptable rate of return on the capital 
employed, such that manufactured goods for export trade would be competitively priced on the 
basis of marginal cost of producing the surplus for export trade over and above the requirements 
to supply domestic demand.” 48  
To build on existing demand in Tanzania’s ‘vibrant and captive consumer market’ (pg. 22), 
government efforts focus on expanding capacity in food and beverage industries.49 
Secondly, policy documents such as Tanzania’s Five-Year Development Plans (FYDPs) for 
2011-2016 and 2016-2021 clearly recognise the need to build manufacturing activities 
backwardly linked to other sectors of the economy, identifying fertilisers and building materials 
as key strategic sectors. Both aspects are in line with the key economic issues of building a 
consumer and intersectoral domestic demand base discussed at the theoretical level in section 
1.  
The government’s sectoral priorities are well reflected in subsectoral output figures. Output 
data from the Tanzanian 2013 census of industrial production show that the biggest sectors are 
the food-processing and beverages sectors followed by non-metallic minerals (cement) 
production, producing 55% and 7% of total gross output respectively and employing 40% and 
4% of the manufacturing workforce respectively (Annex 2). The strong growth of output in 
food and beverage production is primarily driven by soft drinks and bottled beer (increasing by 
122% and 67% respectively since 2004), while many food processing industries such as 
polished rice or canned fruit actually saw their output reduced relative to 2004. Output of 
‘chemicals, petroleum and plastics’ increased by only 29% relative to 1985, yet a number of 
fast-growing subsectors exist especially for building materials like paints and basic consumer 
goods like soap and detergents or plastics products. Similarly, while output growth in ‘basic 
metals’ remains somewhat below average, corrugated iron sheets and rolled steel are both 
among the five fastest growing industries in Tanzania (Annex 1).  
Government spending on infrastructure has surely increased demand for a range of building 
materials in particular cement and steel.50 Contrary to most other African countries, Tanzania 
provides active policy support for its construction industry. 51 However, the only building 
material specifically targeted in the most recent FYDPs is cement production. While the cement 
sector provides employment and offers high wages, the entire sector is foreign owned. Dangote 
has opened Tanzania’s largest cement plant with an installed capacity of 3Mta in 2015. 62.5% 
of the shares of Tanzania’s third largest producer Tanga Cement are owned by AfriSam a South 
Africa based company owned by the Black Economic Empowerment Consortium. 15% of 
AfriSam remains, however, under the ownership of Holcim. The remaining shares of Tanga 
are held by pension funds and local stock exchange listings. The Kenyan owned ARM plant 
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which opened in 2012 is another, albeit much smaller African investor. The remainder of the 
Tanzanian cement production base are under majority ownership of the major European 
multinationals. 69% of Tanzania’s second largest producer – the Tanzania Portland Cement 
Company – are owned by Scancem International, a Norwegian subsidiary of Heidelberg 
Cement. The smaller Mbeya plant is wholly owned by Lafarge. Some smaller Asian players 
control Lee Cement and Lake Cement (Table 4). 
 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
The case of Tanzania’s cement industry illustrates the predicaments that can arise from 
competing interests. Both the establishment of domestic cement manufacturing and the 
promotion of backwardly linked inputs rests on conflicting interests between capitalists and 
bureaucrats. Tanzania’s last government led by president Kikwete, for example, offered 
generous incentives for Dangote to invest in Tanzania including tax exemptions on the import 
of diesel, tax waivers on machinery, government provision of land for Dangote’s factory and 
the facilitation of permits and contracts for expatriate staff. At the same time, government 
regulations aimed at developing the supply chain incentivising procurement of Tanzanian 
energy inputs the Ministry of Energy and Minerals. The ban on coal imports in 2016, however, 
increased Dangote’s production costs.52 In addition, current regulations force Dangote to buy 
gas through middle companies at inflated prices instead of directly from the state-owned 
Tanzania Petroleum Development Company (TPDC). Dangote’s recent shutdown is therefore 
an attempt to exert pressure on the new government led by president Magufuli to relax these 
measures with some noticeable success: Dangote has been awarded its own coal mining license 
after a government report confirmed that Tancoal, the only active coal producer in Tanzania, 
was unable to guarantee the quality and quantity demanded by the market.53 
Existing research on Tanzanian manufacturing firms point to supply-side constraints like 
technological capabilities, infrastructure, access to finance54 and to industrial land, as well as 
the high concentration of exporting firms55 and contending factions of intermediate classes 
within the state.56 As in Nigeria, Tanzania has experienced increased demand for industrial 
goods from a growing consumer class.57 Domestic entrepreneurs tap into these gaps, as for 
instance, Azam Cola, produced by a family owned business that entered the market in 2011 
and gained 30% market shares in just 18 months.58 However, a closer look at output and 
employment figures by sectors and firm sizes suggests hindrances to growth in the final 
consumer demand base, namely the small scale of production of the majority of manufacturing 
establishments and correspondingly low levels of productivity, wages and purchasing power. 
The Tanzanian 2013 census of industrial production reveals that more than 53% of those 
employed in manufacturing work in firms with less than 10 employees. Yet, these firms 
produce merely 5% of total gross output. Output per worker in firms with less than 10 
employees is on average merely 5.2% that of firms with more than 10 employees, ranging from 
1.6% in the tobacco industry to 34.3% in machinery and equipment manufacturing. This 
productivity differential is also reflected in wages and by extension purchasing power of those 
employed in the manufacturing sector (wages per worker in firms with less than 10 employees 
are on average 14.2% of those in bigger firms). The problem of small-scale and comparatively 
unproductive manufacturing activities becomes particularly apparent in the production of 
wearing apparel, textiles and furniture employing together 31% of the total manufacturing 
workforce but contributing merely 9% of total gross output (Annex 2).  
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The problem of small-scale, low productivity production generating few consumption 
multipliers is more far-reaching and concerns large parts of the agricultural sector, which 
employs 75% of the Tanzanian workforce but only produces about 21% of total output in 
2010.59 To understand why these issues are not readily addressed by policy despite well-drafted 
policies on paper requires dissecting distributional conflicts. For instance, initiatives to support 
output growth in the production of food crops like rice through extensive irrigation systems 
were poorly implemented due to half-hearted political support. The political influence of the 
predominately black and small-scale rice producers was scattered and unorganised while 
capitalists in the rice import business dominated by Asian-Tanzanians were important 
financiers of the ruling party and able to resist the introduction import tariffs against their 
immediate interests.60 
 
The Oil and Gas Industry in Tanzania and Nigeria 
Petroleum resources are at the centre of a number of African states’ strategies for 
industrialization. In Nigeria, oil and gas are fundamental to the economy, accounting for over 
75% of exports and 60% of government revenue in 2014 prior to the oil price shock. By 2016, 
oil was closer to 30% of exports and revenues, with revenues also down 30% from 2014.61 
Tanzania is an emerging gas producer with minimal current production but large plans for gas-
based development. The following sections argue, that contrary to resource curse arguments, 
the mining sector does not have to remain an enclave in the economy but can directly and 
indirectly support manufacturing production by way of generating revenues for the government 
and by widening the consumer demand base through job generation in mining-related services. 
The rebasing of Nigeria’s GDP in 2014 not only made Nigeria SSA’s largest economy but also 
indicated that petroleum resources were much less important for Nigeria’s economy than 
previously thought. Adding industries not accounted for in the previous base year of 1990 made 
manufacturing grow from 1.9% of GDP under the old calculation to 9% and Services from 
about 25% to roughly 50% of GDP. However, as anyone even casually familiar with Nigeria’s 
political economy would immediately note, the growth of these sectors does not necessarily 
have anything to do with state policy and is more likely in fact to have occurred despite the 
Nigerian government. The country remains however one of the most developed in SSA in terms 
of its industrial base and workforce skills. This is important for understanding its future 
potential. 
Combined with renewed militancy in the Niger Delta cutting into production, the fall in oil 
prices has left the country in a major economic crisis. Foreign direct investment has been falling 
and the economy has begun contracting while inflation has returned to double digits. Exports 
were down 40% in 2015, ‘decimating government revenues’.62 Despite facing a budget deficit 
of US$11billion, the 2016 budget represented a 20% increase over the previous year, reflecting 
the new president’s desire to spark further industrial transformation through investment in 
national quality infrastructure. There are other indications that the Buhari administration is 
seeking to play a larger role in fostering structural transformation. A core of highly competent 
cabinet ministers have been led by Vice-President Osinbajo in their efforts to revive economic 
planning and direct state investments more effectively toward national development priorities. 
Osinbajo is Chairman of the National Economic Council, an advisory group of state governors, 
key ministers and others. The committee has taken on new importance and an implementation 
steering committee has been formed with high-profile governors and members of cabinet. A 
six-point implementation plan for the 2016 budget focuses on diversifying the economy by 
fast-tracking industrialization, agriculture and agro-processing. The plan aims to increase 
Nigeria’s food output of basic commodities like rice, tomato paste, wheat, maize, soya, poultry 
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and livestock.63 There has also been a focus on solid minerals with an eye toward reviving 
Nigeria’s long-dormant steel industry.  
As Ovadia64 argues, structural transformation of the economy can also be rooted in petroleum 
resources, despite Nigeria being seen as a prime example of the ‘resource curse’ or ‘paradox 
of plenty’.65 After decades of no discernible benefit to the majority of citizens, Nigeria began 
to embrace local content in the mid-2000s. The effort to promote the employment of Nigerians, 
use of Nigerian companies, and value addition in Nigeria was boosted by the 2010 Nigerian 
Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act. The agency it created, the Nigerian Content 
Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB), is now leading a set of initiatives that very 
much resemble the interventionist strategies of East Asian developmental states. They have 
been involved in promoting infant industries such as steel pipe and sub-sea equipment 
manufacturers, spurred the building of new fabrication and yards, and led other initiatives that 
have created thousands of jobs and as of late 2015 prior to a change in executive leadership, 
were spearheading three industrial parks in the Niger Delta states of Imo, Cross River and 
Bayelsa that will specialize in manufacturing of low-cost equipment, component parts, spare 
parts and chemicals.  
The above sector-level analysis can be complemented with case studies of specific firms, as 
Ovadia demonstrates with profiles of ten indigenous oil and oil services firms in Nigeria. 
Quantitative and qualitative research at all three levels of analysis reveal a developmental 
project that has very real aspirations but many challenges ahead. While this paper cannot fully 
go into those, we maintain that the success or failure of Nigerian content and of the Buhari 
government’s recent efforts toward economic diversification can best be researched through an 
extended developmental state framework and adaptation of theory and methodology to 
researching developmental states in the African context. 
Tanzania discovered natural gas in 2012. Since then, a vigorous debate has begun over how 
best to take advantage of these resources to help the country achieve its development objectives. 
Several separate but interrelated support programs have launched since 2012 to link investment 
in the industry to a broader strategy of structural transformation. Working with the African 
Development Bank, i  the EU, UNDP and other international organisations, the National 
Economic Empowerment Council (NEEC) has taken the lead on local content promotion—in 
extractives and throughout the economy. The updated Petroleum Act of 2015 and Draft Local 
Content Regulations of 2017 encourage local participation in the emerging gas industry with 
an aim to increasing in-country value addition and promoting local linkages.  
The World Bank has funded a multi-year study on the potential opportunities for industrial 
development and linkages promotion through the planned Tanzania Liquid Natural Gas (TLNG) 
facility, which will (due to government intervention) process gas from both the Statoil and 
BG/Shell gas projects. The World Bank study66 concludes that by providing goods and services 
to the TLNG project in three areas, Tanzania could capture as much as $2 billion of the total 
$15-$17 billion investment, creating as many as 80,000 direct and indirect jobs. The three 
categories alone account for $12 billion of the $17 billion of spend on the project. They are 
general construction, LNG project-specific industries, and key supporting services. The first 
category is important because building these industries, which operate both inside and out of 
oil and gas and are crucial to structural transformation, leaves a lasting benefit to the Tanzanian 
economy. The second category is important because this is where the majority of spend is 
located for their TLNG project. Capturing even a few percent of the spend would be significant 
                                                 
i Author A has worked as a consultant for the African Development Bank in their programme of support for NEEC 
on local content. 
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for developing heavy industry. Finally, the third category represents ‘low-hanging fruit’, or 
services that Tanzanian companies should be able to provide (like catering, security, cleaning, 
and low-skilled labour) that may not capture significant value but will generate significant 
employment and purchasing power.  
Crucially, the World Bank study demonstrates a significant difference between a ‘base case’ 
in which minimal intervention is carried out prior to the final decision to invest in the TLNG 
project (now not expected before 2020) and a ‘success case’ that assumes government and 
donor intervention to integrate supplier and workforce development interventions. Under the 
success case, local value capture increases from $1.4 billion to $2 billion, while employment 
generated increases from around 60,000 to 80,000. These figures bolster the argument of 
Ovadia and others67 about the significance of local content in oil and gas.  
CONCLUSIONS 
We have argued that one factor largely side-lined by research on development states concerns 
the conditions under which demand for commodity production remains or becomes 
expansionary. This is of particular relevance SSA economies today as they face a global 
economic context tending towards systemic deficient demand. Financialisation in developed 
economies crowds out long-term productive investment and tends to worsen the distribution of 
income and wealth thereby depressing consumer demand. What is more, intense competition 
from China has been shown to displace African manufacturing exports.  
Against this context of shrinking space for export-led industrialisation, domestic 
developmental policy has to mobilise and support the growth of domestic consumer and 
intersectoral demand. Disentangling the conditions under which this occurs or the reasons why 
it does not can provide important additional insights into patterns of growth and stagnation of 
manufacturing activities in SSA. The article draws on selective examples from Tanzania and 
Nigeria to show how certain manufacturing activities in both countries emerged on the basis 
of domestic sources of demand and investigates limitations thereto.  
Large-scale building materials manufacturing in both countries was assisted by the strong 
growth of construction activities, which created a profitable market for building materials. Of 
particular relevance here is not just the emergence of mutual interest between capitalists and 
bureaucrats but also the mediation of conflicting interests. Data on ownership structures in the 
Tanzanian and Nigerian cement industries serve to take account of tendencies towards 
monopolisation and gauge bargaining positions in situations of competing interest. For instance, 
Tanzania’s government actively pursued efforts to build cement and other manufacturing 
industries backwardly linked to the construction sector. Yet, these efforts, while in the mutual 
interest of suppliers and bureaucrats may clash, as they have in Tanzania with the interests of 
foreign investors—even African ones. What is noteworthy is that government support for 
building materials manufacturing in both countries primarily extends to the capital intensive 
cement sector. The developmental potential of linkages between the construction and building 
materials sector could be enhanced by targeting the production of less capital intensive building 
materials more systematically. 
In Nigeria, the anticipated growth of the large domestic consumer market has favoured the re-
investment of profits generated inside and outside of the cement sector. Qualitative evidence, 
for instance, suggests that Dangote’s expansion into other sectors is based on the anticipation 
of growing consumer demand base. In Tanzania, manufacturing output and ownership data 
revealed an enormous differential in wages and productivity between small-scale and medium- 
to large scale manufacturing enterprises with corresponding ramifications for the consumption 
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multiplier processes. Future research will have to uncover the dynamics of redistributive and 
capital-labour relations in greater detail to understand the factors that further or constrain the 
broadening of the domestic consumer demand base.  
The case of petroleum and natural gas production in Nigeria and Tanzania shows that these 
sectors do not have to remain enclaves if mutual interest forms to support linkage formation to 
forwardly and backwardly linked manufacturing activities and local content policies supports 
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